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Abstract
When an outside innovating firm has a technology to produce a higher quality good
than the good produced at present, it can sell licenses of its technology to incumbent
firms, or enter the market and at the same time sell licenses, or enter the market without
license. We examine the definitions of license fee in such a situation in an oligopoly
with three firms under vertical product diﬀerentiation, one outside innovating firm and
two incumbent firms, considering threat by entry of the innovating firm using a two-step
auction. We also present an example of the optimal strategy for the innovating firm under
the assumption of uniform distribution of consumers’ taste parameter and zero cost. Also
we suppose that the innovating firm sells its licenses using a combination of royalty per
output and a fixed license fee.
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1. Introduction
In Proposition 4 of Kamien and Tauman (1986) it was argued that in an oligopoly when the
number of firms is small (or very large), strategy to enter the market and at the same time
license the cost-reducing technology to the incumbent firm (entry with license strategy) is more
profitable than strategy to license its technology to the incumbent firm without entering the
market (license without entry strategy) for the innovating firm. However, their result depends
on their definition of license fee. They defined the license fee in the case of licenses without
entry by the diﬀerence between the profit of an incumbent firm in that case and its profit before
it buys a license without entry of the innovating firm. However, it is inappropriate from the
game theoretic view point. If an incumbent firm does not buy a license, the innovating firm
may punish the incumbent firm by entering the market. The innovating firm can use such a
threat if and only if it is a credible threat. In a duopoly case with one incumbent firm, when
the innovating firm does not enter nor sell a license, its profit is zero; on the other hand, when
it enters the market without license, its profit is positive. Therefore, threat by entry without
license is credible under duopoly, and then even if the innovating firm does not enter themarket,
the incumbent firm must pay the diﬀerence between its profit when it uses the new technology
and its profit when the innovating firm enters without license as a license fee. However, in
an oligopoly with more than one incumbent firms, the credibility of threat by entry is a more
subtle problem.
In this paper we extend this analysis to an oligopolistic situation with three firms, one outside
innovating firm and two incumbent firms under vertical product diﬀerentiation, and examine
the definitions of license fee for producing a higher quality good than the good produced at
present considering a two-step auction in the case of licenses without entry1. Also we suppose
that the innovating firm uses a combination of royalty per output and a fixed license fee. A
two-step auction, for example, in the case of a license to one incumbent firm without entry is
as follows.
(1) The first step.
The innovating firm sells a license to one firm at auction without its entry conditional
on that the bidding price must not be smaller than the minimum bidding price, which
is equal to the willingness to pay for the incumbent firms described below, and the
innovating firm imposes a predetermined (positive or negative) royalty per output on the
licensee. A firm with the maximum bidding price gets a license. If both firms make bids
at the same price, one firm is chosen at random. If no firm makes a bid, then the auction
proceeds to the next step.
(2) The second step.
The innovating firm sells a license to one firm at auction with its entry.
At the first step of the auction, each incumbent firm has a will to pay the following license fee;
1Hattori and Tanaka (2016b) presented an analysis of license and entry choice by an innovating firm in a
duopoly under vertical product diﬀerentiation.
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the diﬀerence between its profit when only this firm uses the new technology
without entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only the rival firm buys
the license with entry of the innovating firm.
In the first step each incumbent firm has an incentive to make a bid when the other firm does
not make a bid. On the other hand, it does not have an incentive to make a bid when the other
firm makes a bid.
We need the eﬀective minimum bidding price because if the minimum price does not
function eﬀectively, when one of the incumbent firms makes a bid which is slightly but strictly
smaller than this price, the other firm does not have an incentive to outperform this bidding.
A two-step auction in the case of licenses to two incumbent firms without entry is similar2,
and at the first step of the auction the incumbent firm has a will to pay the following license
fee;
the diﬀerence between its profit when both firms use the new technology without
entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only the rival firm buys the license
with entry of the innovating firm.
In the first step each incumbent firm has an incentive to make a bid when the other firm
makes a bid because if it does not make a bid, the auction proceed to the next step.
Threat by such a two-step auction is credible if and only if the profit of the innovating firm
when it enters the market with a license to one firm is larger than its profit when it licenses to
one incumbent firm without entering the market.
In the next section we present literature review. In Section 3 the model of this paper is
described. In Section 4 we consider various equilibria of the oligopoly. In Section 5 we
present the license fees under entry with license strategy. In Section 6 we consider a two-step
auction and present the definitions of license fees under license without entry strategy. In
Sections 5 and 6 the following results about the optimal royalty rate for the innovator will be
shown (see Proposition 1).
Entry with license to one firm case The optimal royalty rate may be positive or negative.
Entry with licenses to two firms case If the goods are strategic complements, the optimal
royalty rate is positive. If the goods are strategic substitutes, it may be positive or
negative.
License to one firmwithout entry cases not using two-step auction case If the goods are
strategic substitutes, the optimal royalty rate is negative. If the goods are strategic
complements, it may be positive or negative.
License to one firmwithout entry cases using two-step auction case If the goods are strate-
gic substitutes, the optimal royalty rate is negative. If the goods are strategic comple-
ments, it is positive.
Licenses to two firms without entry cases using or not using two-step auction case Theop-
timal royalty rate is positive.
2Please see Section 6.2.2.
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Also in Section 6 we examine the credibility of two-step auction, and will show the following
results (see Proposition 2).
(1) If the cost function of the new technology is linear, the profit of the innovating firm
when it enters the market with a license to one firm and its profit when it licenses to one
incumbent firm without entering the market are equal, that is, entry with license to one
firm case and license to one firm without entry case are equivalent.
(2) If the cost function of the new technology is strictly convex, two-step auction is credible.
(3) If the cost function of the new technology is strictly concave, two-step auction is not
credible.
In Section 7 we present an example with uniform distribution of consumers’ taste parameter
and zero cost. We will show that when two-step auction is credible, license to two firms
without entry strategy is optimal; on the other hand, when it is not credible, entry without
license strategy is optimal. In Appendix we present analyses of demand and inverse demand
functions.
2. Literature review
Various studies focus on technology adoption orR&D investment in duopoly or oligopoly. Most
of them analyze the relation between the technology licensor and licensee. The diﬀerence of
means of contracts, which comprise royalties, upfront fixed fees, combinations of these two,
and auctions, are well discussed (Katz and Shapiro (1985)). Kamien and Tauman (2002)
showed that outside innovators prefer auctions, but industry incumbents prefer royalty. This
topic is discussed by Kabiraj (2004) under the Stackelberg oligopoly; here, the licensor does
not have production capacity. Wang andYang (2004) considered the case when the licensor has
production capacity. Sen and Tauman (2007) compared the license system in detail, namely,
when the licensor is an outsider and when it is an incumbent firm, using the combination of
royalties and fixed fees. However, the existence of production capacity was externally given,
and they did not analyze the choice of entry. Therefore, the optimal strategies of outside
innovators, who can use the entry as a threat, require more discussion. Regarding the strategies
of new entrants to the market, Duchene, Sen and Serfes (2015) focused on future entrants with
old technology, and argued that a low license fee can be used to deter the entry of potential
entrants. However, the firm with new technology is incumbent, and its choice of entry is
not analyzed. Also, Chen (2016) analyzed the model of the endogenous market structure
determined by the potential entrant with old technology and showed that the licensor uses the
fixed fee and zero royalty in both the incumbent and the outside innovator cases, which are
exogenously given. Creane, Chiu and Konishi (2013) examined a firm that can license its
production technology to a rival when firms are heterogeneous in production costs, and showed
that a complete technology transfer from one firm to another always increases joint profit under
weakly concave demand when at least three firms remain in the industry.
A Cournot oligopoly with fixed fee under cost asymmetry was analyzed by La Manna
(1993). He showed that if technologies can be replicated perfectly, a lower cost firm always has
4
the incentive to transfer its technology; hence, while a Cournot-Nash equilibrium cannot be
fully asymmetric, there exists no non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. On the
other hand, using cooperative game theory, Watanabe and Muto (2008) analyzed bargaining
between a licensor with no production capacity and oligopolistic firms. Recent research
focuses on market structure and technology improvement. Boone (2001) and Matsumura et.
al. (2013) found a non-monotonic relation between intensity of competition and innovation.
Also, Pal (2010) showed that technology adoption may change the market outcome. The
social welfare is larger in Bertrand competition than in Cournot competition. However, if
we consider technology adoption, Cournot competition may result in higher social welfare
than Bertrand competition under a diﬀerentiated goods market. Hattori and Tanaka (2015)
and (2016a) studied the adoption of new technology in Cournot duopoly and Stackelberg
duopoly. Rebolledo and Sandonís (2012) presented an analysis of the eﬀectiveness of research
and development (R&D) subsidies in an oligopolistic model in the cases of international
competition and cooperation in R&D. Hattori and Tanaka (2016b) analyzed problems about
product innovation, that is, introduction of higher quality good in a duopoly with vertical
product diﬀerentiation.
3. Themodel
Ourmodel of vertical product diﬀerentiation is according toMussa andRosen (1978), Bonanno
and Haworth (1998) and Tanaka (2001). There are three firms, Firms A, B and C. Firm A can
produce the high-quality good whose quality is kH , and Firms B and C produce the low-quality
good whose quality is kL , where kH > kL > 0. kH and kL are fixed. Both of the high-quality
and the low-quality goods are produced at the same cost.
At present only Firms B and C produce the low-quality good. FirmA is an outside innovator,
and it may sell licenses to use its technology for producing the high-quality good to one or two
incumbent firms (Firms B and C), and it can enter the market with the high-quality good. Call
Firm A the innovating firm and Firms B and C the incumbent firms.
Firm A has five options.
(1) To enter the market, and license its technology to no incumbent firm.
(2) To enter the market, and license its technology to one incumbent firm.
(3) To enter the market, and license its technology to two incumbent firms.
(4) To license its technology to one incumbent firm, but does not enter the market.
(5) To license its technology to two incumbent firms, but does not enter the market.
The cost function of the firms is c(·), which is twice continuously diﬀerentiable. There is no
fixed cost; thus c(0) = 0.
In the market there is a continuum of consumers with the same income, denoted by y, but
diﬀerent values of the taste parameter ξ. Each consumer buys at most one unit of the good.
If a consumer with parameter ξ buys one unit of a good of quality k at price p, his utility is
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equal to y − p + ξk. If a consumer does not buy the good, his utility is equal to his income
y. The parameter ξ is distributed according to a twice continuously diﬀerentiable distribution
function ρ = F(ξ) in the interval 0 < ξ ≤ 1. We assume that there is no atom. ρ denotes
the probability that the taste parameter is smaller than or equal to ξ. The size of consumers is
normalized as one. The inverse function of F(ξ) is denoted by G(ρ). Note that G(1) = 1.
Let pL and qL be the price and supply of the good of quality kL; pH and qH be the price and
supply of the good of quality kH; and let qA, qB and qC be the outputs of Firms A, B and C.
In the cases with licenses the game proceeds as follows. In the first stage Firm A determines
the royalty rate. In the second stage firms determine the outputs, and the fixed license fee is
determined.
4. General analysis
4.1. Entry without license case
Suppose that Firm A (the innovating firm) enters into the market without license to Firm B
nor C. Then, Firm A supplies the high-quality good and Firms B and C supply the low-quality
good. Let ξL be the value of ξ for which the corresponding consumer is indiﬀerent between
buying nothing and buying the low-quality good. Then,
ξL =
pL
kL
.
Let ξH be the value of ξ for which the corresponding consumer is indiﬀerent between buying
the low-quality good and buying the high-quality good. Then
ξH =
pH − pL
kH − kL .
Let qH = qA and qL = qB + qC . The inverse demand function is described as follows.
(1) When qH > 0 and qL > 0, we have pH = (kH − kL)G(1 − qH) + kLG(1 − qH − qL) and
pL = kLG(1 − qH − qL).
(2) When qH > 0 and qL = 0, we have pH = kHG(1 − qH) and pL = kLG(1 − qH).
(3) When qH = 0 and qL > 0, we have pH = kH − kL + kLG(1− qL) and pL = kLG(1− qL).
(4) When qH = 0 and qL = 0, we have pH = kH and pL = kL .
Since G(1) = 1, this is a continuously diﬀerentiable function with the domain 0 ≤ qH ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ qH ≤ 1. For details of derivation of the inverse demand function please see Appendix
A.3.
The profits of Firms A, B and C are written as
piA = [(kH − kL)G(1 − qA) + kLG(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qA − c(qA),
piB = kLG(1 − qA − qB − qC)qB − c(qB),
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piC = kLG(1 − qA − qB − qC)qB − c(qC).
The first order conditions for profit maximization of Firms A, B and C are
∂piA
∂qA
=(kH − kL)G(1 − qA) + kLG(1 − qA − qB − qC)
− [(kH − kL)G′(1 − qA) + kLG′(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qA − c′(qA) = 0,
∂piB
∂qB
= kLG(1 − qA − qB − qC) − kLG′(1 − qA − qB − qC)qB − c′(qB) = 0,
∂piC
∂qC
= kLG(1 − qA − qB − qC) − kLG′(1 − qA − qB − qC)qC − c′(qC) = 0.
The second order conditions are
∂2piA
∂q2A
= − 2[(kH − kL)G′(1 − qA) + kLG′(1 − qA − qB − qC)]
+ [(kH − kL)G′′(1 − qA) + kLG′′(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qA − c′′(qA) < 0,
∂2piB
∂q2B
= −kL[2G′(1 − qA − qB − qC) − G′′(1 − qA − qB − qC)qB] − c′′(qB) < 0,
∂2piC
∂q2C
= −kL[2G′(1 − qA − qB − qC) − G′′(1 − qA − qB − qC)qC] − c′′(qC) < 0.
Hereafter we assume that the second order conditions in each case are satisfied.
Denote the equilibrium profits of Firms A, B and C in this case by pie0A , pi
e0
B and pi
e0
C .
4.2. Entry with license to one firm case
Suppose that Firm A enters into the market and licenses its technology for producing the high-
quality good to one of the incumbent firms. We assume that it is Firm C. Then, Firms A and C
produce the high-quality good, and Firm B produces the low-quality good. Let qH = qA + qC
and qL = qB. The inverse demand function is the same as that in the previous case.
Denote the royalty per output and the fixed license fee by r and L. The profits of Firms A,
B and C are
piA = [(kH − kL)G(1 − qA − qC) + kLG(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qA − c(qA),
piB = kLG(1 − qA − qB − qC)qB − c(qB),
piC = [(kH − kL)G(1 − qA − qC) + kLG(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qC − c(qC) − rqC − L.
The first order conditions are
(kH − kL)G(1 − qA − qC) + kLG(1 − qA − qB − qC) (1a)
− [(kH − kL)G′(1 − qA − qC) + kLG′(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qA − c′(qA) = 0,
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kLG(1 − qA − qB − qC) − kLG′(1 − qA − qB − qC)qB − c′(qB) = 0, (1b)
(kH − kL)G(1 − qA − qC) + kLG(1 − qA − qB − qC) (1c)
− [(kH − kL)G′(1 − qA − qC) + kLG′(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qC − c′(qC) − r = 0.
Denote the equilibrium profits of Firms A, B and C by pie1A , pi
e1
B and pi
e1
C . Diﬀerentiating (1a),
(1b) and (1c) with respect to r , we obtain dqAdr ,
dqA
dr and
dqA
dr . About details of them see Appendix
B. We have dqCdr < 0. If the goods are strategic substitutes, σ’s are negative, and
dqA
dr and
dqB
dr
are positive. If the goods are strategic complements, σ’s are positive, and dqAdr and
dqB
dr are
negative.
4.3. Entry with licenses to two firms case
Suppose that Firm A enters into the market and licenses its technology for producing the
high-quality good to both incumbent firms. Then, all firms produce the high-quality good.
Let ξ0 be the value of ξ for which the corresponding consumer is indiﬀerent between buying
nothing and buying the high-quality good. Then
ξ0 =
pH
kH
.
Let qH = qA + qB + qC . The inverse demand function is described as follows.
(1) When qH > 0, we have pH = kHG(1 − qH).
(2) When qH = 0, we have pH = kH .
Since G(1) = 1, this is a continuously diﬀerentiable function. About details for derivation of
the inverse demand function please see Appendix A.1.
The profits of the firms are
piA = kHG(1 − qA − qB − qC)qA − c(qA).
piB = kHG(1 − qA − qB − qC)qB − c(qB) − rqB − L.
piC = kHG(1 − qA − qB − qC)qC − c(qC) − rqC − L.
The first order conditions are
kHG(1 − qA − qB − qC) − kHG′(1 − qA − qB − qC)qA − c′(qA) = 0. (2a)
kHG(1 − qA − qB − qC) − kHG′(1 − qA − qB − qC)qB − r − c′(qB) = 0, (2b)
kHG(1 − qA − qB − qC) − kHG′(1 − qA − qB − qC)qC − r − c′(qC) = 0. (2c)
Denote the equilibrium profits of Firms A, B and C by pie2A , pi
e2
B and pi
e2
C . Diﬀerentiating (2a),
(2b) and (2c) with respect to r , we obtain dqAdr ,
dqB
dr and
dqC
dr . About details of them see Appendix
C. We have dqBdr < 0 and
dqC
dr < 0. If the goods are strategic substitutes, σ’s are negative and
dqA
dr is positive. If the goods are strategic complements, σ’s are positive and
dqA
dr is negative.
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4.4. License to one firmwithout entry case
Suppose that Firm A sells a license of its technology to one of the incumbent firms and does
not enter the market. We assume that it is Firm C. Firm B still produces the low-quality good.
Let qH = qH and qL = qB. The inverse demand function is the same as that in the entry without
license case.
The profits of Firms B and C are
piB = kLG(1 − qB − qC)qB − c(qB),
piC = [(kH − kL)G(1 − qC) + kLG(1 − qB − qC)]qC − c(qC) − rqC − L.
The first order conditions are
kLG(1 − qB − qC) − kLG′(1 − qB − qC)qB − c′(qB) = 0, (3a)
(kH − kL)G(1 − qC) + kLG(1 − qB − qC) − [(kH − kL)G′(1 − qC) (3b)
+ kLG
′(1 − qB − qC)]qC − r − c′(qC) = 0.
Denote the equilibrium profits of Firms B and C by pil1B and pi
l1
C . Diﬀerentiating (3a) and (3b)
with respect to r , we obtain
dqB
dr
= −−kLG
′(1 − qB − qC) + kLG′′(1 − qB − qC)qB
Γ
,
and
dqC
dr
=
−2kLG′(1 − qB − qC) + kLG′′(1 − qB − qC)qB − c′′(qB)
Γ
< 0,
where
θC = − 2[(kH − kL)G′(1 − qC) + kLG′(1 − qB − qC)] + [(kH − kL)G′′(1 − qC)
+ kLG
′′(1 − qB − qC)]qB − c′′(qC),
Γ =[−2kLG′(1 − qB − qC) + kLG′′(1 − qB − qC)qB − c′′(qB)]θC .
4.5. Licenses to two firms without entry case
Suppose that Firm A sells licenses of its technology to two incumbent firms and does not enter
the market. Then, Firms B and C produce the high-quality good. Let qH = qB + qC . The
inverse demand function is the same as that in the entry with licenses to two firms case.
The profits of the firms are
piB = kHG(1 − qB − qC)qB − c(qB) − rqB − L,
piC = kHG(1 − qB − qC)qC − c(qC) − rqC − L.
The first order conditions are
kHG(1 − qB − qC) − kHG′(1 − qB − qC)qB − r − c′(qB) = 0, (4a)
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kHG(1 − qB − qC) − kHG′(1 − qB − qC)qC − r − c′(qC) = 0. (4b)
Denote the equilibrium profits of Firms B and C by pil2B and pi
l2
C . In this case we have qB = qC .
Diﬀerentiating (4a) and (4b) with respect to r , we obtain
dqB
dr
=
dqC
dr
=
−kHG′(1 − qB − qC) − c′′(qB)
Γ′
< 0,
where
Γ′ =[−2kHG′(1 − qB − qC) + kHG′′(1 − qB − qC)qB − c′′(qB)]×
[−2kHG′(1 − qB − qC) + kHG′′(1 − qB − qC)qC − c′′(qC)].
5. Royalty and license fees in the cases of licenses with entry
In the cases of licenses with entry the fixed license fee is equal to the usual willingness to pay
for the incumbent firms. We follow the arguments by Kamien and Tauman (1986) and Sen
and Tauman (2007) about license fees by auction.
5.1. License to one firm
The willingness to pay for each incumbent firm is equal to
the diﬀerence between its profit when only this firm uses the technology for
producing the high-quality good with entry of the innovating firm and its profit
when only the rival firm buys the license with entry of the innovating firm.
This is because each incumbent firm knows that there will be one licensee regardless of whether
or not it buys a license. The incumbent firms B and C have the same willingness to pay, so
even when one of them does not make a bid, the rival firm gets the license. The fixed license
fee is
Le1 = (pie1C + Le1) − pie1B .
This equation means pie1C = pi
e1
B . The total payoﬀ of Firm B in this case is written as
ϕe1 = pie1A + rqC + L
e1 =[(kH − kL)G(1 − qA − qC) + kLG(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qA − c(qA)
+ [(kH − kL)G(1 − qA − qC) + kLG(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qC
− c(qC) − (kLG(1 − qA − qB − qC)qB − c(qB)).
Using the first order conditions, the condition for maximization of ϕwith respect to r is written
as follows.
dϕe1
dr
=r
dqC
dr
− (kH − kL)G′(1 − qA − qC)
(
qC
dqA
dr
+ qA
dqC
dr
)
− kLG′(1 − qA − qB − qC)
[
(qC − qB)dqAdr + (qA − qB)
dqC
dr
+ (qA + qC)dqBdr
]
= 0,
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Then, we get the optimal royalty rate for the innovator as follows.
r˜e1 =
(kH − kL)G′(1 − qA − qC)
dqC
dr
(
qC
dqA
dr
+ qA
dqC
dr
)
(5)
+
kLG′(1 − qA − qB − qC)
dqC
dr
[
(qC − qB)dqAdr + (qA − qB)
dqC
dr
+ (qA + qC)dqBdr
]
.
This may be positive or negative.
5.2. Licenses to two firms
The willingness to pay for each incumbent firm in this case is equal to
the diﬀerence between its profit when two firms use the technology for producing
the high-quality good with entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only
the rival firm buys the license with entry of the innovating firm.
This is because each incumbent firm knows that there will be one licensee when it does not buy
a license. In this case there is a minimum bidding price which is equal to the willingness to
pay for the incumbents because without the minimum bidding price no firm makes a positive
bid. The fixed license fee is
Le2 = (pie2C + Le2) − pie1B .
This means pie2C = pi
e1
B . The total payoﬀ of the innovator is
ϕe2 =pie2A + r(qB + qC) + 2Le2 = kHG(1 − qA − qB − qC)(qA + qB + qC)
− c(qA) − c(qB) − c(qC) − 2pie1B .
Note that pie1B is constant and irrelevant to determination of the royalty rate in this case. Using
the first order conditions, the condition for maximization of ϕe2 with respect to r is written as
follows.
dϕe2
dr
= r
(
dqB
dr
+
dqC
dr
)
− kHG′(1 − qA − qB − qC)(qB + qC)dqAdr
− kHG′(1 − qA − qB − qC)(qA + qC)dqBdr − kHG
′(1 − qA − qB − qC)(qA + qB)dqCdr = 0.
The optimal royalty rate is
r˜e2 =
kHG′(1 − qA − qB − qC)
dqB
dr +
dqB
dr
[
(qB + qC)dqAdr + (qA + qC)
dqB
dr
+ (qA + qB)dqCdr
]
.
If the goods are strategic complements, r˜e2 > 0. If the goods are strategic substitutes, r˜e2 may
be positive or negative.
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6. Royalty and license fees in the case of licenses without
entry: two-step auction
6.1. One-step auction
If the licenses are auctioned oﬀ to the incumbent firms by one-step auction, the fixed license
fee is determined by the usual willingness to pay for the incumbent firms described in Kamien
and Tauman (1986) and Sen and Tauman (2007).
6.1.1. License to one firm
The willingness to pay for each incumbent firm is equal to
the diﬀerence between its profit when only this firm uses the technology for
producing the high-quality good without entry of the innovating firm and its profit
when only the rival firm buys the license without entry of the innovating firm.
Then, the fixed license fee is
Ll1 = (pil1C + Ll1) − pil1B .
This equation means pil1C = pi
l1
B . Denote L in this case by L˜
l1, and denote the total payoﬀ of the
innovator in this case by ϕ˜l1 to distinguish it from the total payoﬀ in the two-step auction case.
It is
ϕ˜l1 =rqC + L˜
l1 = [(kH − kL)G(1 − qC) + kLG(1 − qB − qC)]qC − c(qC)
− (kLG(1 − qB − qC)qB − c(qB)).
Using the first order conditions, the condition for maximization of ϕ˜l1 with respect to r is
written as
dϕ˜l1
dr
= (r + kLG′(1 − qB − qC)qB)dqCdr − kLG
′(1 − qB − qC)qC dqBdr = 0,
Then, we obtain the optimal royalty rate for the innovator as follows.
r l1 = − kLG
′(1 − qB − qC)
dqC
dr
(
qB
dqC
dr
− qC dqBdr
)
. (6)
Denote it by r˜ l1. If the goods are strategic substitutes, r˜ l1 < 0. If the goods are strategic
complements, r˜ l1 may be positive or negative.
6.1.2. Licenses to two firms
The willingness to pay for each incumbent firm in this case is equal to
the diﬀerence between its profit when two firms use the technology for producing
the high-quality good without entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only
the rival firm buys the license without entry of the innovating firm.
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There is a minimum bidding price which is equal to the willingness to pay for the incumbents.
The fixed license fee is
Ll2 = (pil2C + Ll2) − pil1B .
This means pil2C = pi
l1
B . Denote L in this case by L˜
l2, and denote the total payoﬀ of the innovator
by ϕ˜l2. It is
ϕ˜l2 = r(qB + qC) + 2L˜l2 = kHG(1 − qB − qC)(qB + qC) − c(qB) − c(qC) − 2pil1B .
Note that pil1B is constant and irrelevant to determination of the royalty rate. The condition for
maximization of ϕ˜l2 with respect to r is
dϕ˜l2
dr
= r
(
dqB
dr
+
dqC
dr
)
− kHG′(1 − qB − qC)qB dqCdr − kHG
′(1 − qB − qC)qC dqBdr = 0.
The optimal royalty rate is
r l2 =
kHG′(1 − qB − qC)
dqB
dr +
dqC
dr
(
qB
dqC
dr
+ qC
dqB
dr
)
.
Denote it by r˜ l2. This is positive.
6.2. Two-step auction
We consider a two-step auction for each case.
6.2.1. License to one firm
In this case the two-step auction is practiced as follows.
(1) The first step.
The innovating firm sells a license to one firm at auction without its entry conditional
on that the bidding price must not be smaller than the minimum bidding price, which
is equal to the willingness to pay for the incumbent firms described below, and the
innovating firm imposes a predetermined (positive or negative) royalty per output on the
licensee. A firm with the maximum bidding price gets a license. If both firms make bids
at the same price, one firm is chosen at random. If no firm makes a bid, then the auction
proceeds to the next step.
(2) The second step.
The innovating firm sells a license to one firm at auction with its entry. Then, the
willingness to pay for each incumbent firm in this step is
pie1C + L
e1 − pie1B .
At the first step of the auction, each incumbent firm has a will to pay the following license fee;
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the diﬀerence between its profit when only this firm uses the technology for
producing the high-quality good without entry of the innovating firm and its profit
when only the rival firm buys the license with entry of the innovating firm.
Then, the license fee is
Ll1 = (pil1C + Ll1) − pie1B .
This equation means pil1C = pi
e1
B . Denote L in this case by Lˆ
l1.
In the first step each incumbent firm has an incentive to make a bid with the license fee Lˆl1
when the other firm does not make a bid. On the other hand, it does not have an incentive to
make a bid when the other firm makes a bid. We need the eﬀective minimum bidding price
Lˆl1 because the profit of a non-licensee is pil1B which is larger than pi
e1
B . If the minimum price
does not function eﬀectively, when one of the incumbent firms makes a bid which is slightly
but strictly smaller than this price, the other firm does not have an incentive to outperform this
bidding.
Denote the total payoﬀ of the innovator in this case by ϕˆl1. Then,
ϕˆl1 = rqC + Lˆ
l1 = [(kH − kL)G(1 − qC) + kLG(1 − qB − qC)]qC − c(qC) − pie1B .
Note that pie1B is a constant number which is determined in the entry with a license to one firm
case. The condition for maximization of ϕ with respect to r is
dϕˆl1
dr
= r
dqC
dr
− kLG′(1 − qB − qC)qC dqBdr = 0.
Then, we obtain the optimal royalty rate for the innovator as follows.
r l1 =
kLG′(1 − qB − qC)qC
dqC
dr
dqB
dr
. (7)
Denote it by rˆ l1.
6.2.2. Licenses to two firms
We consider the following two-step auction
(1) The first step.
The innovating firm sells licenses to two firms at auction without its entry conditional
on that the bidding price must not be smaller than the minimum bidding price, which
is equal to the willingness to pay for the incumbent firms described below and both
firms make bids, and the innovating firm imposes a predetermined (positive or negative)
royalty per output on the licensee . If both firms make bids, they get licenses. If at least
one of the firms does not make a bid, then the auction proceeds to the next step.
(2) The second step.
The innovating firm sells a license to one firm at auction with its entry. Then, the
willingness to pay for each incumbent firm in this step is
pie1C + L
e1 − pie1B .
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At the first step of the auction, each incumbent firm has a will to pay the following license fee;
the diﬀerence between its profit when two firms use the technology for producing
the high-quality good without entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only
the rival firm buys the license with entry of the innovating firm.
The minimum bidding price should be equal to this willingness to pay. Then, the license fee is
Ll2 = (pil2C + Ll2) − pie1B .
This means pil2C = pi
e1
B . Denote L in this case by Lˆ
l2.
In the first step each incumbent firm has an incentive to make a bid when the other firm
makes a bid because if it does not make a bid, the auction proceeds to the next step.
Denote the total payoﬀ of the innovator in this case by ϕˆl2. It is
ϕˆl2 = r(qB + qC) + 2Lˆl2 = kHG(1 − qB − qC)(qB + qC) − c(qB) − c(qC) − 2pie1B .
Note that pie1B is constant and irrelevant to determination of the royalty rate in this case. The
condition for maximization of ϕˆl2 with respect to r is
dϕˆl2
dr
= r
(
dqB
dr
+
dqC
dr
)
− kHG′(1 − qB − qC)
(
qB
dqC
dr
+ qC
dqB
dr
)
= 0.
r˜ =
kHG′(1 − qB − qC)
dqB
dr +
dqC
dr
(
qB
dqC
dr
+ qC
dqB
dr
)
.
Denote it by rˆ l2. We see rˆ l2 = r˜ l2, but the total payoﬀ of the innovator with two-step auction
and that without two-step auction are diﬀerent.
Summarizing the results about the optimal royalty rates for the innovator.
Proposition 1. Entry with license to one firm case The optimal royalty rate may be positive
or negative.
Entry with licenses to two firms case If the goods are strategic complements, the optimal
royalty rate is positive. If the goods are strategic substitutes, it may be positive or
negative.
License to one firmwithout entry case not using two-step auction case If the goods are strate-
gic substitutes, the optimal royalty rate is negative. If the goods are strategic comple-
ments, it may be positive or negative.
License to one firmwithout entry case using two-step auction case If the goods are strate-
gic substitutes, the optimal royalty rate is negative. If the goods are strategic comple-
ments, it is positive.
Licenses to two firms without entry case using or not using two-step auction case The op-
timal royalty rate is positive.
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6.3. Credibility of two-step auction
In this subsection we will prove our main results. The innovating firm uses a two-step auction
if and only if the threat by the existence of the second step of the auction is credible, and it is
credible if and only if the total payoﬀ of the innovating firm when it enters the market with a
license to one firm is larger than its payoﬀ when it does not enter and sells a license to one firm
not using a two-step auction. Therefore, if
pie1A + r˜
e1qC + L
e1 ≥ r˜ l1qC + L˜l1,
two-step auction is credible. On the other hand, if
r˜ l1qC + L˜
l1 > pie1A + r˜
e1qC + L
e1,
two-step auction is not credible.
We show the following proposition. Note that we assume c(0) = 0, that is, the fixed cost is
zero.
Proposition 2. (1) If the marginal cost is constant, that is the cost function is linear, entry
with license to one firm case and license to one firm without entry case are equivalent.
(2) If the cost function of the firms is strictly convex, two-step auction is credible.
(3) If the cost function of the firms is strictly concave, two-step auction is not credible.
Proof. (1) First consider the case of entry with a license to one firm. Let q¯ = qA + qC .
Denote the constant marginal cost by c, and denote the total payoﬀ of the innovator by
ϕe1. It is written as
ϕe1 =pie1A + rqC + L
e1 = [(kH − kL)G(1 − qA − qC) + kLG(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qA
− cqA + [(kH − kL)G(1 − qA − qC) + kLG(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qC − cqC
− (kLG(1 − qA − qB − qC)qB − cqB)
=[(kH − kL)G(1 − q¯) + kLG(1 − q¯ − qB)]q¯ − cq¯ − (kLG(1 − q¯ − qB)qB − cqB).
If the marginal cost is constant, c′′ = 0. Thus, dq¯dr =
dqA
dr +
dqC
dr and
dqB
dr in Section 4.2 are
written as (see also Appendix B)
dq¯
dr
=
[−(kH − kL)G′(1 − q¯) + kLG′(1 − q¯ − qB)]θB
∆′
,
dqB
dr
= −[−(kH − kL)G
′(1 − q¯) + kLG′(1 − q¯ − qB)]σB
∆′
.
where
θB = −kL[2G′(1 − q¯ − qB) − G′′(1 − q¯ − qB)qB],
σB = −kHG′(1 − q¯ − qB) + kHG′′(1 − q¯ − qB)]qB.
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The condition for maximization of ϕe1 with respect to r is
λ1
dq¯
dr
− λ2 dqBdr = 0, (8)
where
λ1 =(kH − kL)G(1 − q¯) + kLG(1 − q¯ − qB)
− [(kH − kL)G′(1 − q¯) + kLG′(1 − q¯ − qB)]q¯ − c + kLG′(1 − q¯ − qB)qB,
λ2 = kLG(1 − q¯ − qB) − kLG′(1 − q¯ − qB)qB − c + kLG′(1 − q¯ − qB)q¯.
From (1a) and (1c) we have
(kH − kL)G(1 − q¯) + kLG(1 − q¯ − qB) − [(kH − kL)G′(1 − q¯)
+ kLG
′(1 − q¯ − qB)]q¯ − c = r − [(kH − kL)G(1 − q¯) + kLG(1 − q¯ − qB)] + c.
From this and (1b), (8) is rewritten as
{r − [(kH − kL)G(1 − q¯) + kLG(1 − q¯ − qB)] + c + kLG′(1 − q¯ − qB)qB} dq¯dr
− kLG′(1 − q¯ − qB)q¯ dqBdr = 0.
Then, the optimal royalty rate is written as
r˜e1 =(kH − kL)G(1 − q¯) + kLG(1 − q¯ − qB) − c − kLG′(1 − q¯ − qB)qB
− kLG′(1 − q¯ − qB)q¯σB
θB
.
The first order condition for Firm C, (1c), with r = r˜e1 is rewritten as
(kH − kL)G(1 − q¯) + kLG(1 − q¯ − qB)
− [(kH − kL)G′(1 − q¯) + kLG′(1 − q¯ − qB)]qC − c
− (kH − kL)G(1 − q¯) − kLG(1 − q¯ − qB) + c + kLG′(1 − q¯ − qB)qB
+ kLG
′(1 − q¯ − qB)q¯σB
θB
= − [(kH − kL)G′(1 − q¯) + kLG′(1 − q¯ − qB)]qC + kLG′(1 − q¯ − qB)qB
+ kLG
′(1 − q¯ − qB)q¯σB
θB
= 0.
With qA + qC = q¯, this and the first order condition for Firm A, (1a),
(kH − kL)G(1 − q¯) + kLG(1 − q¯ − qB) − [(kH − kL)G′(1 − q¯)
+ kLG
′(1 − q¯ − qB)]qA − c = 0
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imply
(kH − kL)G(1 − q¯) + kLG(1 − q¯ − qB) − [(kH − kL)G′(1 − q¯) (9)
+ kLG
′(1 − q¯ − qB)]q¯ − c + kLG′(1 − q¯ − qB)qB
+ kLG
′(1 − q¯ − qB)q¯σB
θB
= 0.
Next consider the case of license to one firm without entry not using a two-step auction.
Let q¯ = qC . Denote the total payoﬀ of the innovator in this case by ϕ˜l1. It is written as
ϕ˜l1 = [(kH − kL)G(1 − q¯) + kLG(1 − q¯ − qB)]q¯ − cq¯ − (kLG(1 − q¯ − qB)qB − cqB).
This is the same as ϕe1. If c′′ = 0, dq¯dr =
dqC
dr and
dqB
dr in Section 4.4 are written as
dq¯
dr
=
θB
∆
,
dqB
dr
= −σB
∆
,
θB and σB in this case are the same as those in the previous case. The condition for
maximization of ϕ˜l1 with respect to r is
{[(kH − kL)G(1 − q¯) + kLG(1 − q¯ − qB)] − [(kH − kL)G′(1 − q¯) (10)
+ kLG
′(1 − q¯ − qB)] − c + kLG′(1 − q¯ − qB)qB} dq¯dr
− [kLG(1 − q¯ − qB) − kLG′(1 − q¯ − qB)qB − c + kLG′(1 − q¯ − qB)q¯]dqBdr = 0.
From (3a) and (3b), (10) is rewritten as
(r + kLG′(1 − q¯ − qB)qB)dq¯dr − kLG
′(1 − q¯ − qB)q¯ dqBdr = 0.
Then, the optimal royalty rate is
r˜ l1 = −kLG′(1 − q¯ − qB)qB − kLG′(1 − q¯ − qB)q¯σB
θB
.
The first order condition for Firm C, (3b), with qC = q¯ and r = r˜ l1 is rewritten as
(kH − kL)G(1 − q¯) + kLG(1 − q¯ − qB) − [(kH − kL)G′(1 − q¯) (11)
+ kLG
′(1 − q¯ − qB)]qC − c + kLG′(1 − q¯ − qB)qB
+ kLG
′(1 − q¯ − qB)q¯σB
θB
= 0.
(9) and (11) are the same. Therefore, two cases are equivalent.
(2) ϕe1 with q¯ = qA + qC is
ϕe1 =[(kH − kL)G(1 − q¯) + kLG(1 − q¯ − qB)]q¯ − c(qA) − c(qC)
− (kLG(1 − q¯ − qB−)qB − c(qB)).
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ϕ˜l1 with q¯ = qC is written as
ϕ˜l1 =[(kH − kL)G(1 − q¯) + kLG(1 − q¯ − qB)]q¯ − c(q¯) − (kLG(1 − q¯ − qB−)qB − c(qB))
=ϕe1 + c(qA) + c(qC) − c(qA + qC).
If the cost function is strictly convex,
c(qC) < qCqA + qC c(qA + qC) +
(
1 − qC
qA + qC
)
c(0) = qC
qA + qC
c(qA + qC),
c(qA) < qAqA + qC c(qA + qC) +
(
1 − qA
qA + qC
)
c(0) = qA
qA + qC
c(qA + qC).
Then,
c(qA) + c(qC) < c(qA + qC).
Separation of production between two firms is more eﬃcient than concentration to one
firm. Thus, ϕe1 is larger than ϕ˜l1 when qA + qC in the case of entry with a license and
qC in the case of license without entry are equal, and the maximum value of ϕe1 is larger
than the maximum vale of ϕ˜l1. Hence, two-step auction is credible.
(3) Similarly to the case of strictly convex cost function, if the cost function is strictly
concave, we find
c(qA) + c(qC) > c(qA + qC).
Concentration of production to one firm is more eﬃcient than separation between two
firms. Thus, ϕ˜l1 is larger than ϕe1 when qA + qC in the case of entry with a license and
qC in the case of license without entry are equal, and the maximum value of ϕ˜l1 is larger
than the maximum vale of ϕe1. Hence, two-step auction is not credible.
□
7. An example
As an examplewe assume that ρ = F(θ) has a uniform distribution. Then, ρ = θ, θ = G(ρ) = ρ,
F′(θ) = G′(ρ) = 1 and F′′(θ) = G′′(ρ) = 0. We consider a case of convex cost function. The
cost function of the firms is c(qi) = 12 kLq2i , i = A, B,C. Denote kH = qkL, q > 1. We present
summaries of the calculation results.
License to one firmwithout entry not using two-step auction case The optimal royalty rate
and the total payoﬀ of the innovator are
r˜ l1 = − kL
3
< 0,
r˜ l1qC + L˜
l1 =
kL(9q2 − 6q − 2)
12(3q + 1) .
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Figure 1: Optimal strategy for the innovator when 0 < q <
√
3+1
2
Entry without license case The profit of the innovator is
pie0A =
kL(2q − 1)2(2q + 1)
2(4q + 1)2 .
Entry with license to one firm case The optimal royalty rate and the total payoﬀ of the inno-
vator are
r˜e1 =
kL(q + 1)2(9q2 − 12q − 1)
2(3q + 1)(3q2 + 12q + 1) ,
pie1A + r˜
e1qC + L˜
e1 =
kL(9q4 + 30q3 − 8q2 − 14q − 1)
4(3q + 1)(3q2 + 12q + 1) .
If 1 < q <
√
5+2
3 , r˜
e1 < 0.
Entry with licenses to two firms case The optimal royalty rate and the total payoﬀ of the
innovator are
r˜e2 =
2kLq2(q + 1)2
(2q + 1)(2q2 + 6q + 1) > 0,
pie2A + r˜
e2(qB + qC) + 2L˜e2
=
kL
4(2q + 1)(3q + 1)2(2q2 + 6q + 1)(3q2 + 12q + 1)2 (324q
10 + 3672q9 + 14904q8
+ 25368q7 + 14805q6 − 3318q5 − 7781q4 − 3660q3 − 777q2 − 78q − 3).
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Figure 2: Optimal strategy for the innovator when q >
√
3+1
2
License to one firmwithout entry case using two-step auction case Theoptimal royalty rate
and the total payoﬀ of the innovator are
rˆ l1 = − kL(3q − 1)
3(6q + 1) < 0,
rˆ l1qC+Lˆ
l1 =
kL
24(3q + 1)2(6q + 1)(3q2 + 12q + 1)2 (2916q
8 + 22842q7 + 44307q6
− 7452q5 − 23031q4 − 8838q3 − 1371q2 − 120q − 5).
Licenses to two firms without entry case using two-step auction case Theoptimal royalty
rate and the total payoﬀ of the innovator are
rˆ l2 =
kLq2
4q + 1
> 0,
rˆ l2(qB + qC)+2Lˆl2 = kL4(3q + 1)2(4q + 1)(3q2 + 12q + 1)2 (324q
8 + 2700q7 + 6345q6
+ 2454q5 − 1761q4 − 1728q3 − 521q2 − 66q − 3).
Comparing pie1A + r˜
e1qC + L˜e1 and r˜ l1qC + L˜l1,
pie1A + r˜
e1qC + L˜
e1 − (r˜ l1qC + L˜l1) = kL(3q − 1)(15q + 1)12(3q + 1)(3q2 + 12q + 1) > 0.
Therefore, two-step auction is credible. About this example we get the following results.
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(1) If 0 < q <
√
3+1
2 (≈= 1.366), licenses to two firms without entry strategy is optimal for
the innovator. Please see Figure 1.
(2) If q >
√
3+1
2 , entry with licenses to two firms strategy is optimal for the innovator. Please
see Figure 2.
Appendices
A. Detailed analysis of demand functions
If a consumer with taste parameter ξ buys one unit of a good of quality k at price p, his utility
is equal to y − p + ξk. Let ξ0 be the value of ξ for which the corresponding consumer is
indiﬀerent between buying nothing and buying the high-quality good. Then,
ξ0 =
pH
kH
.
Let ξL be the value of ξ for which the corresponding consumer is indiﬀerent between buying
nothing and buying the low-quality good. Then,
ξL =
pL
kL
.
Let ξH be the value of ξ for which the corresponding consumer is indiﬀerent between buying
the low-quality good and buying the high-quality good. Then
ξH =
pH − pL
kH − kL .
We find
ξ0 =
(kH − kL)ξH + kLξL
kH
.
Therefore, ξL ≥ ξ0 ≥ ξH or ξH > ξ0 > ξL .
For ξ > (<)ξL ,
y − pL + ξkL > (<)y.
For ξ > (<)ξ0,
y − pH + ξkH > (<)y.
For ξ > (<)ξH ,
y − pH + ξkH > (<)y − pL + ξkL .
A.1. Licenses to two firms without entry case
In this case Firms B and C produce the high-quality good. Let qH be the demand for the
high-quality good. Then, we get
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(1) When pH ≥ kH (ξ0 ≥ 1), we have qH = 0.
(2) When pH < kH (ξ0 < 1), we have qH = 1 − F(ξ0).
Then, the inverse demand function is described as follows.
(1) When qH > 0, we have pH = kHG(1 − qH).
(2) When qH = 0, we have pH = kH .
This is a continuously diﬀerentiable inverse demand function with the domain 0 ≤ qH ≤ 1.
We have qH = qB + qC .
A.2. Licenses to two firms with entry case
In this case all firms produce the high-quality good. Let qH = qA + qB + qC . The inverse
demand function is the same as that in Case A.1.
A.3. License to one firmwithout entry case
In this case Firm C produces the high-quality good, and Firm B produces the low-quality good.
Let qH be the demand for the high-quality good and qL be the demand for the low-quality good.
Then, we get3
(1) When pH ≥ kH (ξ0 ≥ 1) and pL ≥ kL (ξL ≥ 1), we have qH = 0 and qL = 0.
(2) When pH < kH (ξ0 < 1) and pL ≥ pHkH kL (ξL ≥ ξ0 ≥ ξH), we have qH = 1 − F(ξ0) and
qL = 0.
(3) When pL < kL (ξL < 1), pH > pLkL kH (ξH > ξ0 > ξL) and pH − pL ≥ kH − kL (ξH ≥ 1),
we have qH = 0 and qL = 1 − F(ξL).
(4) When pL < kL (ξL < 1), pH > kHkL pL (ξH > ξ0 > ξL) and pH − pL < kH − kL (ξH < 1),
we have qL = F(ξH) − F(ξL) and qH = 1 − F(ξH).
From this demand function we obtain the inverse demand function as follows.
(1) When qH > 0 and qL > 0, we have pH = (kH − kL)G(1 − qH) + kLG(1 − qH − qL) and
pL = kLG(1 − qH − qL).
(2) When qH > 0 and qL = 0, we have pH = kHG(1 − qH) and pL = kLG(1 − qH).
(3) When qH = 0 and qL > 0, we have pH = kH − kL + kLG(1− qL) and pL = kLG(1− qL).
(4) When qH = 0 and qL = 0, we have pH = kH and pL = kL .
This is a continuously diﬀerentiable inverse demand function with the domain 0 ≤ qH ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ qL ≤ 1. We have qH = qC and qL = qB.
3We owe this formulation to an anonymous referee.
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A.4. Entry with license to one firm case
In this case Firms A and C produce the high-quality good, and Firm B produces the low-quality
good. The inverse demand function is the same as that in Case A.3 with qH = qA + qC and
qL = qB.
A.5. Entry without license case
In this case Firm A produces the high-quality good, and Firms B and C produce the low-
quality good. The inverse demand function is the same as that in Case A.3 with qH = qA and
qL = qB + qC .
B. Details about dqAdr ,
dqB
dr and
dqC
dr in Section 4.2.
Diﬀerentiating (1a), (1b) and (1c) with respect to r , we obtain
dqA
dr
=
σABσB − σACθB
∆′
,
dqB
dr
=
σACσB − σBθA
∆′
,
dqC
dr
=
θAθB − σABσB
∆′
,
where
θA =
∂2piA
∂q2A
= − 2[(kH − kL)G′(1 − qA − qC) + kLG′(1 − qA − qB − qC)]
+ [(kH − kL)G′′(1 − qA − qC) + kLG′′(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qA − c′′(qA),
θB =
∂2piB
∂q2B
= −kL[2G′(1 − qA − qB − qC) − G′′(1 − qA − qB − qC)qB] − c′′(qB),
θC =
∂2piC
∂q2C
= − 2[(kH − kL)G′(1 − qA − qC) + kLG′(1 − qA − qB − qC)]
+ [(kH − kL)G′′(1 − qA − qC) + kLG′′(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qC − c′′(qC),
σAB =
∂2piA
∂qAqB
= −kLG′(1 − qA − qB − qC) + kLG′′(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qA,
σAC =
∂2piA
∂qAqC
= −(kH − kL)G′(1 − qA − qC) + kLG′(1 − qA − qB − qC)
+ [(kH − kL)G′′(1 − qA − qC) + kLG′′(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qA,
σB =
∂2piB
∂qBqA
=
∂2piB
∂qBqC
= −kLG′(1 − qA − qB − qC) + kLG′′(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qB,
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σCA =
∂2piC
∂qCqA
= −(kH − kL)G′(1 − qA − qC) + kLG′(1 − qA − qB − qC)
+ [(kH − kL)G′′(1 − qA − qC) + kLG′′(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qC,
σCB =
∂2piC
∂qCqB
= −kLG′(1 − qA − qB − qC) + kLG′′(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qC,
∆′ = θAθBθC − θAσBσCB − θBσACσCA − θCσABσB + σACσBσCB + σABσBσCA.
By the second order conditions, θA < 0, θB < 0, θC < 0. From the stability conditions for
oligopoly (Seade (1980) and Dixit (1986)) ∆′ < 0 and we can assume that the absolute
values of θA, θB and θC are larger than those of σ’s. We have dqCdr < 0. If the goods are
strategic substitutes, σ’s are negative and dqAdr and
dqB
dr are positive. If the goods are strategic
complements, σ’s are positive and dqAdr and
dqB
dr are positive.
C. Details about dqAdr ,
dqB
dr and
dqC
dr in Section 4.3.
Diﬀerentiating (2a), (2b) and (2c) with respect to r , we obtain
dqA
dr
=
σA(σB − θB + σC − θC)
∆
,
dqB
dr
=
θAθC − θAσB + σAσB − σAσC
∆
,
dqC
dr
=
θAθB − θAσC + σAσC − σAσB
∆
,
where
θA = −2kHG′(1 − qA − qB − qC) + kHG′′(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qA − c′′(qA),
θB = −2kHG′(1 − qA − qB − qC) + kHG′′(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qB − c′′(qB),
θC = −2kHG′(1 − qA − qB − qC) + kHG′′(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qC − c′′(qC),
σA = −kHG′(1 − qA − qB − qC) + kHG′′(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qA,
σB = −kHG′(1 − qA − qB − qC) + kHG′′(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qB,
σC = −kHG′(1 − qA − qB − qC) + kHG′′(1 − qA − qB − qC)]qC,
∆ = θAθBθC − θAσBσC − θBσAσC − θCσAσB + σAσBσC .
By the second order conditions, θA < 0, θB < 0, θC < 0. From the stability conditions for
oligopoly (Seade (1980) and Dixit (1986)) ∆ > 0 and we can assume that the absolute values
of θA, θB and θC are larger than those of σA, σB and σC . We have dqBdr < 0 and
dqC
dr < 0. If the
goods are strategic substitutes, σ’s are negative and dqAdr is positive. If the goods are strategic
complements, σ’s are positive and dqAdr is negative.
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